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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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Military acquisition relies upon industry for new product development, but market 
organizational control is not recommended for knowledge-intensive work.  Unfortunately, 
increasing hierarchy-control mechanisms, such as formalization, could reduce trust.  What is the 
appropriate balance of control mechanisms and trust for an IPT in the DoD acquisition realm?  
We conducted interviews and surveys in a major military acquisition program office employing 
IPTs, Alpha Contracting and collocation.  We found that the relationship between formalization 
and trust was different between government and contractor team members.  Acquisition 
managers must understand the relationships between control mechanisms and trust within and 
between organizations to increase collaboration between government and contract personnel.   
Key words: Trust, Organizational control, Transaction-cost Economics 
Introduction 
The government and industry partnership is central in the military acquisition domain—
with both parties pursuing both common and separate goals based upon their buyer and seller 
roles. Organizational control theory holds that in such environments of differing goals, managers 
can use three types of control systems: the market, the bureaucratic, and the clan (Ouchi, 
1980). In market organizational control systems, managers contract with and then monitor their 
suppliers. In bureaucratic (hierarchical) organizational control systems, formal control 
mechanisms (such as rules and regulations) are enforced through hierarchies.  Workers within 
clan organizational control systems self-manage using common values, traditions and beliefs.  
Acquisition of new weapon systems has traditionally employed the market form of organizational 
control with the industry side of the partnership, and bureaucratic organizational control within 
the Department of Defense (DoD).   
Given the nature of new product development, DoD Program Management Offices 
typically operate in the context of relatively high asset specificity, risk aversion and uncertainty.  
Although these variables have been shown by research to encourage the switchover from 
market to hierarchy control, the government/industry buyer/seller relationship precludes the 
adoption of hierarchical organizational control or even quasi-vertical integration.   
However, over the last 10 years, defense acquisition has adopted Integrated Product 
and Process Development (IPPD), using Integrated Product Teams (IPT) to encourage 
government and contractor personnel to work more closely together to design and build new 
products (OUSD, 1998).  IPTs, Alpha Contracting, management councils and other 
organization-oriented changes (such as collocation of government and contractor personnel) 
have extended the market form of organizational control; yet, each of these must stop short of 
switching over to the hierarchical or bureaucratic organizational control form given the 
separation of public and private enterprise. 
The government’s goal orientation in its procurement pursuits is provided in the guiding 
principles of FAR Part 1.102: 
The Federal Acquisition System will—(1) Satisfy the customer in terms of cost, quality, 
and timeliness of the delivered product or service by, for example—(i) Maximizing the use of 
commercial products and services; (ii) Using contractors who have a track record of successful 
past performance or who demonstrate a current superior ability to perform; and (iii) Promoting 
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competition; (2) Minimize administrative operating costs; (3) Conduct business with integrity, 
fairness, and openness; and (4) Fulfill public policy objectives. (FAR, 2004) 
In short, the government seeks the best possible value of goods and services for the 
least cost to the taxpayer, while industry seeks to maximize profit while avoiding competition.  
Fundamental goal differences notwithstanding, this partnership has historically yielded 
unmatched military capability, as well as profit for shareholders. 
Trust has also been recognized as a critical ingredient in modern defense acquisition 
(Siemsen, 2002).  Although trust is considered to be the basis of the clan form of organizational 
control, scholars recently have observed that trust can be used to extend market control and to 
avoid switching over to hierarchical control.    
This research study asks: What is the appropriate balance of hierarchy-control 
mechanisms and trust for an IPT in the DoD acquisition realm? 
In this paper we describe the changes in work structure in major military acquisition 
programs employing the IPPD and Alpha Contracting approaches.  We analyze the risks for 
client and supplier representatives in new product development teamwork and develop 
hypotheses about the effect of control mechanisms—such as formalization—on interpersonal 
trust.  We conducted eighteen interviews and a survey in a major weapon system program 
office employing IPTs, Alpha Contracting and collocation to test our hypotheses.  We analyze 
and report the results and describe the implications for managers of IPTs. 
THE EVOLVING GOVERNMENT/INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIP 
New product development is increasingly undertaken in the context of inter-firm 
collaboration, in which a client firm engages an outside supplier to design and/or engineer a 
component, subsystem or process (Carson, Madhok, Vasrman & John, 2003).  Likewise, in 
defense acquisition the government engages industry suppliers with contracts to develop their 
new products.  Because the US government is often the sole purchaser of newly developed 
weapon systems, something of a monopsony exists in which the supplier cannot sell the product 
to another purchaser without the government’s consent.  Similarly, once the government selects 
a single supplier to develop a new technology, the supplier gains a competitive advantage over 
other suppliers, creating a monopoly supply situation for follow-on procurement contracts.   
Therefore, the power of buyer and seller are somewhat balanced in a situation in which asset 
specificity develops and partners change to entail extremely high transaction costs.  In such a 
situation, exit costs are high for both parties: the cost to the government of nonperformance by 
the contractor is high, and the cost to the contractor of finding another partner is very high as 
well.   
Alpha Contracting 
The government’s traditional contracting approach (before acquisition reforms of the last 
decade) required successive iterations between the client and the supplier—to discover the 
client’s requirements and the applicable supplier technologies—until a relatively complete 
contract could be written.  This traditional sequential interdependency relationship has changed 
to a closer reciprocal interdependency relationship with Alpha Contracting, in which the client 
and supplier work together to define the requirements and discover solutions.  Again, the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation gives guidelines for this dialogue: 
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The Government must not hesitate to communicate with the commercial sector 
as early as possible in the acquisition cycle to help the Government determine 
the capabilities available in the commercial marketplace.  The Government will 
maximize its use of commercial products and services in meeting Government 
requirements. (FAR Part 1.102-2) 
Alpha Contracting has evolved from a 1990s-era reform initiative aimed at improving 
government and contractor communications in order to increase efficiency and effectiveness.  
At its very foundation is a need for increased trust and teaming toward common 
government/industry objectives, within the paradigm of their buyer/seller relationship.  By 
encouraging more collaboration early in the contracting negotiations phase, Alpha Contracting 
reduces procurement costs and cycle time via joint and concurrent processes and information 
flows.  Key activities in the process are: specification of requirements, preparation of the 
statement of work, negotiations and executive review.  Even though direct savings may be hard 
to quantify, most agree the savings derived from Alpha Contracting are substantial, even if the 
only savings counted is the increase in the program office staff’s time free to solve other 
problems (Nissen, 1997). As Siemsen (2002) explained, the indirect benefits extend to both 
government and contractor as monitoring costs of other agencies like Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA) and Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) are precluded.  This 
initiative actually seeks and obtains the information that enables a trust-based partnership. The 
shift from sequential to concurrent requirements definition and design is happening in many 
industries, not only the DoD.  For example, the construction industry has adopted the 
design/build approach.   
In addition to collaborating on the requirements definition and contracting phase of new 
product development, the interpersonal closeness developed in the Alpha Contracting approach 
can be carried over to the development stage.  The use of Integrated Product Teams (IPT) 
encourages the government’s user representatives and the contracting supplier’s engineers to 
work together as the new product is designed and the initial prototypes are built. In some 
instances, the government’s representatives and the contractor’s engineers are collocated in the 
same building.  The potential advantages of this increasingly close interdependency between 
client and supplier are to shorten the design process, reduce development costs and, hopefully, 
to increase the quality of the resulting product.  These advantages mainly apply to the 
government, but the advantage to the contractor in such closer interaction might be a perceived 
increase in the likelihood of winning a future competitive bid. The potential disadvantages of this 
trend towards more concurrent engineering include the difficulties of achieving higher 
interdependencies between everyone involved in the project, including the government 
representatives and the contractor’s engineers, designers and developers. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL MECHANISMS: MARKET, HIERARCHY AND CLAN 
Transaction-cost economics proposes that when the specific identity of the parties has 
an important cost-bearing significance, the transaction becomes idiosyncratic, rather than 
unspecialized (Williamson, 1979).  Cost economies in production occur if the supplier develops 
a special-purpose plant or the labor force develops special-purpose skills in the course of 
contract execution.  Special-purpose skills, which can reduce transaction costs, include 
institutional and personal trust.   
Although both buyer and supplier have long-term interests in implementing changes 
through a strategy of joint-profit maximizing (meaning value to each partner), each also has an 
interest in appropriating as much of the gain as possible (Williamson, 1979).  Productivity 
benefits can result in excessive haggling, which could dissipate the benefit of the changes to 
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both parties.  Alternatively, those changes could go unrealized for fear of initiating an expensive 
conflict.  The government buyer has to trust the contractor supplier will take advantage of all 
potential productivity-improvement opportunities.  The contractor supplier has to trust the 
government client will share the benefits from productivity improvements fairly. 
Ouchi proposes three fundamentally different forms of organizational control for dealing 
with the problem of obtaining cooperation among individuals or collectives—like government 
buyers and contracting suppliers—who share only partially congruent objectives. These are 
market organizational control, hierarchy organizational control and clan organizational control 
(1979). 
Market Organizational Control and Price  
Market organizational control is based upon price (Adler, 2001), which can be a very 
efficient control mechanism, but the conditions for an efficient market do not always exist.  In 
new product development, exactly how long it will take to develop a new technology or how 
much it will cost is difficult to predict; these unknowns make writing a fixed-price contract 
impractical.  In the uncertain conditions provided within research and development (R&D), the 
government has adopted the practice of awarding cost-reimbursable contracts.  This means that 
suppliers won’t compete on price alone, but on more intangible aspects, such as their 
demonstrated skills, abilities and facilities; this increased range of competition reduces the 
strength of the market form of organizational control.  In new product development, the client 
wants the supplier to develop extensive knowledge about the technology and users—making 
market-organizational control less attractive.  Notwithstanding the U.S. government’s sovereign 
right to terminate contracts for cause or convenience, the government’s ability to wield market 
organizational control can become limited over time by the difficulty of exiting the relationship to 
buy from another supplier due to the asset specificity the new supplier has developed.  
Switching suppliers will incur huge costs and considerable time due to getting a new supplier 
“up to speed” on the new technology. 
Hierarchy Control and Authority 
When asset specificity and governance costs are high, hierarchical organizational 
control, based upon the exercise of authority (Adler, 2001), has advantages over market control 
(Chiles & McMakin, 1996).  Hierarchical organizational control involves control mechanisms 
largely based upon formalization, which is establishing rules and monitoring behavior to ensure 
compliance with the rules.  Unfortunately, formalization has a large administrative overhead in 
writing and enforcing rules.  Also, in new product development, writing rules that cover all 
conditions when the transformation process is unknown is difficult; likewise, in knowledge work 
such as R&D, monitoring adherence to rules is difficult.   
Clan Organizational Control and Trust 
Ouchi suggests people must be able to either trust each other (i.e. have congruent 
goals) or to monitor performance (1979).  Since monitoring performance is difficult in new 
product development, the situation calls for the clan form of control, which is based upon trust 
(Adler, 2001). Clan control relies on a “deep level of common agreement between members on 
what constitutes proper behavior, and it requires a high level of commitment on the part of each 
individual to those socially prescribed behaviors” (Ouchi, 1979).  IPTs, Alpha Contracting and 
collocation can be seen as a move away from market and hierarchical control in the direction of 
clan form of organizational control.  In order for clan control to be effective, the organization 
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must have or develop an appropriate organizational culture involving higher levels of trust. 
Unfortunately, many managerial strategies fail due to incompatibility with the organizational 
culture (Schneider, 2000). 
PRICE, AUTHORITY AND TRUST IN NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT  
Military acquisition of new products involves all three organizational control systems 
described by Ouchi (1979).  The formal relationship between the government and the contractor 
is a market-based control mechanism using contracts and market power. Once the contractual 
relationship is established, an IPT organization is set up and the government implements formal 
control mechanisms.  When the work starts, informal social mechanisms develop.  Through the 
life of the project, at different levels of organization (from the top level of contact between the 
government and contractor, through the IPT structure to the individual team members), the 
three forms of organizational control operate in various combinations (Ouchi, 1979).   
Several studies have looked at the conditions under which each control mechanism will 
be used. Some researchers propose that most organizations use some combination of all three 
control mechanisms of price, authority and trust (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Adler, 2001).  Adler 
proposes that, particularly for knowledge-based assets which form the basis for new product 
development, price and authority are relatively ineffective control mechanisms compared to 
trust. 
Gunnarson and Levitt propose that when the reduction in production savings achieved 
through economies of scale in outsourcing is less than the increases in transaction costs due to 
asset specificity, the firm will switchover from market to hierarchy control (1982).  New product 
development has two out of three of the sources of asset specificity found in idiosyncratic 
transactions, including technology specificity and knowledge specificity, but not typically location 
specificity.  With high asset specificity and low economies of scale, the product development 
organization is likely to switchover from a market to hierarchy form of organizational control.  
Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) found that asset specificity is positively and significantly 
related to greater degrees of quasi-integration.  This means that new product development is 
more likely to be vertically integrated than other activities. 
The US military predominately out-sources its research and development of new 
weapon systems; thus, it does not have complete hierarchical control over its selected industry 
providers.  Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) found that trust was positively and significantly 
related to greater degrees of quasi-integration.  This means that the closer the organization was 
to a hierarchy, the more trust developed.  But Chiles and McMackin propose that when there 
are higher levels of trust, the switchover from market to hierarchy will occur later (1996).  
Therefore, the effects of trust can be to extend the range of market control and delay the 
switchover from market to hierarchy.   
This study asks: when the client organization extends the range of the market form of 
organizational control in new product development, what effect will this have on interpersonal 
trust between IPT members? 
Trust in New Product Development 
In this research, trust is defined as the trustor’s willingness to accept the risk of relying 
on a trustee, even when the trustor is unable to monitor or control the trustee (Rousseau, Sitkin, 
Burt & Camerer, 1998; see also Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995).  In the trust equation 
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(Hardin, 2000), “Person A trusts Person B about X,” which is the object of trust. Zolin and Hinds 
(2004) extended the equation to say “when Z,” where Z is the context of trust.  
Trust is considered to be essential to cooperation (Kollock, 1994) and expected to have 
an impact on performance (Dirks, 1999), particularly in knowledge-intensive work (Lane, 1998) 
such as new product development.  
Trust is highly influenced by the perceived trustworthiness of the trustee, the context 
(Rousseau, Sitkin & Camerer, 1998; McEvily, Perrrone & Zaheer, 2003, Zolin, Hinds, Fruchter & 
Levitt, 2004) and the history of the relationship.  Perceived trustworthiness is the trustor’s 
assessment of the trustee.  This multidimensional construct is proposed to contain the 
dimensions of ability, benevolence and integrity.  Ability reflects the trustee’s skills and 
resources required for the necessary performance.  Benevolence represents the extent that two 
parties share the same objectives; the trustor can trust the trustee to make decisions and act as 
the trustor would in the situation.  Hardin calls this “encapsulated interests” (1998).  Integrity is 
the trustee’s honesty in not misrepresenting the situation. 
There are many dynamics involving risk (vulnerability) and trust from the organizational 
to the interpersonal levels within the Program Management Office in the IPT structure.  As 
mentioned before, the two parent organizations may have different economic objectives, but 
they agree to work together to achieve the project goals of designing and developing the 
desired product within time, cost and quality constraints.   
Individual team members also have different objectives depending upon their role in the 
design process.  For example, a design engineer could have different (and sometimes 
conflicting) objectives from the government’s user representative.  In the ITP, the government 
personnel represent the user and have extensive knowledge of how the product will be used in 
the field or what the logistical or maintenance issues will be.  The government representative’s 
function is to give the contractor engineer advice on how to design the component to maximize 
the value to the user.  The engineer’s job is to solve the engineering problems involved in the 
design of a new component or in integration of the new component into the system.  To do so, 
the engineer has to understand the many constraints imposed by the function of the component 
and its interaction with other components in the system.  The government representative’s 
suggestions could remove some constraints, making the component easier to design. Or he/she 
could add new requirements, making the component more difficult to design.  The engineer has 
to trust the government representative in order to accept the advice.   If the government 
representative is wrong, the contractor’s engineer could have to do a lot of additional work 
redesigning or reintegrating the component.  Therefore, the engineer must trust that the 
government’s representative knows the user’s requirements (ability), has concern for the 
engineer’s work, won’t change the requirements without good reason (benevolence) and will be 
honest about what happens (integrity).  Similarly, the government representative has to trust the 
engineer to listen to the advice, to accept or reject the advice based upon a sound knowledge of 
the constraints (ability), to not take the easy way out to reduce work (benevolence) and to be 
honest about the situation (integrity). 
Risk, Trust and Control Mechanisms 
Trust is only relevant when there is risk in the relationship.  In addition to the usual risks 
of collaborative work—such as the free rider problem, in which an individual shirks his or her 
duties knowing that others in the group will perform them (Hardin, 1971)—new product 
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development entails additional uncertainty regarding the ability of the design engineers to 
develop the new product to the client’s specifications within the scheduled time and budget. 
Trust and control mechanisms are strategies for dealing with the freedom of the other 
party to take actions that may disadvantage the trustor.  Because the trustee has freedom to 
act, the trustor wants to reduce the amount of risk he/she is exposed to.  While a trustor may 
use control mechanisms, such as formalization of contracts, to limit the size of risk or the 
likelihood or failure by the trustee, ultimately collaboration requires some risk and, consequently, 
requires some trust.   
Das and Teng propose that trust and control mechanisms work as supplements, rather 
than alternatives, to create cooperation and reduce opportunistic behavior in inter-firm alliances 
(1998).  Leifer & Mills define control as a “regulatory process by which the elements of a system 
are made more predictive through the establishment of standards in the pursuit of some desired 
objective or state” (1996, p. 117).  Das and Teng also use the concept of control mechanisms, 
which are organizational arrangements designed to determine and influence what organization 
members will do.  If trust and control mechanisms are supplementary, they will have a positive 
relationship, such that the more control mechanisms there are, the more trust will develop. 
Alternatively, some theorists propose that trust and control are complimentary.  In other 
words: the more trust there is, the less control mechanisms are needed, or the more control 
mechanisms are used, the less trust develops.  Sitkin and Roth propose that legalistic 
remedies—i.e., “mechanisms that are institutionalized, mimic legal forms, and exceed legal 
regulatory requirements” (1993, p. 367)—will fail to restore trust and could lead to an 
“inflationary spiral” of increasingly formalized relations.  They distinguish between trust based 
upon ability and distrust based upon generalized value incongruence.  They propose that 
legalistic mechanisms are more effective in addressing reliability issues than value 
incongruence.  Researchers have found that highly formalized management-control systems 
lead to escalating distrust when they are mismatched to the task at hand, such as the use of 
precise and deterministic measurement and monitoring in conditions characterized by high 
levels of uncertainty (Sitkin & Stickle, 1996).   
Organizational boundaries could influence the relationship between trust and control. 
Dyads operating within the same organization could have a supplementary relationship between 
trust and control because controls provide protection and reduce the risk needed for trust.  In 
contrast, when dyads operate across organizational boundaries, there could be more value 
incongruence.  We propose that dyads operating across organizational boundaries will have a 
negative relationship between trust and control mechanisms, while those operating within the 
same organization will have a positive relationship. 
Hypothesis 1: When the trustor and trustee belong to the same organization, there will 
be a positive relationship between control mechanisms such as formalization and trust. 
Hypothesis 2: When the trustor and trustee belong to different organizations, there will 
be a negative relationship between control mechanisms such as formalization and trust. 
METHODOLOGY  
This research project studied a target population composed of all twenty-eight IPT teams 
in an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D major defense acquisition development program. Those 
IPT teams contained 368 members consisting of government, civilian, military and contractor 
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employees.  The research consisted of two elements: qualitative interviews and a quantitative 
survey. 
Eighteen semi-structured interviews were conducted onsite with 12 government 
personnel and 6 contractor personnel.  Interviews were voluntary and individuals self-selected 
to be interviewed.  The growing size of the project IPT was mentioned by the Project Manager 
prior to the study as a potential problem.  Questions were asked about collocation, team size 
and Alpha Contracting, but respondents were also encouraged to raise their own issues and 
discuss what problems and solutions they perceived.  
Team members were asked to complete an online survey.  A non-probability 
convenience sampling method was used.  Team members were invited to respond on a 
voluntary basis.  
Respondents were asked to answer questions about their demographics as well as 
questions about their relationship with the trustee.  The respondents were asked to provide 
information on their work relationship with four other employees chosen at random. This design 
created pairs of trustor (respondent)/trustee called “directional dyads.” The directional dyad is 
the unit of analysis.  The sample size was 370 directional dyads. 
Except for questions about the frequency of communication, all variables were 
measured using a 7-point Likert scale from “Strongly disagree” (1 point) to “Strongly agree” (7 
points). Where a question was reversed in the meaning from the overall direction of other 
questions, the result for that question was reversed (i.e., a 1 was converted to a 7). 
Trust (α = .72) and perceived trustworthiness (α = .96) were measured using scales 
developed by Mayer and Davis (1999).  Zolin, Fruchter, Hinds and Leavitt (2004) proposed the 
questions for risk and reward, and a scale for perceived follow-through (α = .88). Formalism (α = 
.80) was measured on a scale developed by Hanks and Chandler (1995). Project 
communication, coordination communication and personal communication were measured by 
the number of times the topic was discussed per week. 
Analysis 
For the 370 directional dyads, t-tests for differences in means for government versus 
contractor personnel were conducted.  To test for interrelationships between the variables, we 
computed Pearson correlation coefficients with respective p-values.  Linear regression was 
used to model the relationship between the trust as the dependent variable and the various 
independent variables.   
QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
Collocation, Alpha Contracting and Team Size 
Most individuals interviewed reported being collocated with their team members.  The 
general consensus was that collocation was better, making communication easier.  The positive 
attitude towards collocation was shared by both government and contractor personnel, but the 
government personnel appeared to appreciate collocation more.  Government personnel 
reported that before collocation they had to make formal appointments to meet with contractors, 
journey from one building to the other (several miles) and waste the trip if the other party 
became unavailable.  Collocation provided the opportunity to meet informally.  
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The few individuals whose teams were divided between two buildings reported that 
geographic distribution made communication difficult and slowed the process.  Sometimes, 
although the team was collocated, the respondent had to work with other teams that were 
geographically distant, which caused problems.  For example, a contract team member reported 
that difficulties arose from not being close to the Configuration Management team.  Geographic 
separation was reported to increase “stove piping,” although even those who were collocated 
reported this issue.   
Alpha Contracting was positively received, although some contractor personnel were not 
familiar with the term.  Alpha Contracting was mainly associated with collocation of government 
and contractor personnel. 
Although several respondents mentioned they had never worked in such a large project 
team, the overall size of the project was not mentioned as a problem.  A problem which was 
mentioned more than once was the ineffectiveness of large meetings (described as consisting 
of 30 to 80-plus people).  The difficulty of making decisions in such a large meeting was 
mentioned by four government personnel.   
Another problem related to team size was the difficulty created by team growth.  The 
addition of new team members was reported to slow things down because each addition had to 
be briefed on what was happening.   
Problems and solutions 
The onsite interviews had a higher response rate from government (11) than contractor 
(6) personnel.  As would be expected, the individuals who volunteered to be interviewed had 
strong opinions (usually negative) about the project.  Only one respondent mentioned no 
problems.  Respondents mentioned many of the problems that IPTs and Alpha Contracting are 
designed to overcome, including lack of communication, stove piping, and lack of integration.  
Problems mentioned included: 
1. Stove piping, conflict, personalities, career-agenda people 
2. Disrespect for top management 
3. Lack of communication, coordination, cooperation 
4. Schedule-driven, overly ambitious schedule 
5. Micro-management 
6. Lack of integration 
7. Lack of discipline, lack of control and lack of strong leadership 
8. Large meetings 
9. Lack of training 
Complaints were more often directed toward the system than individuals.  Government 
and contractor personnel were just as likely to criticize their own organization’s performance as 
that of the other organization.  Despite this, there was a general feeling of frustration by 
government personnel who felt they had no control and no way to make the contractors heed 
their advice, despite sometimes feeling like they had superior training and experience to that of 
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the contractors.  Some contractor personnel also felt the government should take more control 
of the situation and give more direction.   
Many respondents complained about the IPT team structure.  There appeared to be two 
groups:  those who preferred the “traditional” structure in which the “government told the 
contractors what to do” and those who preferred the IPT approach, but thought it wasn’t being 
followed.  The Traditionalists were the larger group and represented both government and 
contractor personnel.  Typical complaints by the Traditionalists were lack of discipline, lack of 
control and lack of strong leadership.  Typical complaints by the IPT supporters were lack of 
adequate training. One government IPT supporter said:  
There is no such thing as a Government IPT. The Government IPT was created 
by those who refuse to break with tradition.  Folks in a Government IPT do their 
own thing and then talk to the contractor when they’ve made up their minds.  In a 
real IPT, the government is a representative, not a lead. -Government 
representative 
The difficulty of integration was mentioned by both government and contractor 
personnel.  Integration includes the need for coordination of design changes across the IPT.  
One Contractor mentioned, “people don’t want to make changes, it takes more work.”   
Many of the individuals who volunteered for interviews belong to IPTs that have to 
integrate across the existing IPT structure; for example, some teams were described as 
Interface IPTs creating components (such as cabling) to connect system parts.  If a part 
changes, the cables connecting to it have to change.  Besides being made to work extra if a part 
changes, these individuals are not always told when something upstream changes.  Two IPTs 
were created by the government to represent the two prototypes under construction and to 
integrate across the functional IPTS; yet, these two government IPTs weren’t reflected in the 
contractor structure at the time of the interviews. 
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1, which shows the means, standard 
deviations and F-statistic for the comparison of government and contractor personnel (See 
Table 1).  Both government and contractor trustors had high levels of trust, between which there 
was no significant difference (F-statistic = 2.19, n.s.).  When we distinguish dyads by both 
trustor and trustee (e.g., government trustor and government trustee—G to G), the dyad type 
with the highest trust was government to contractor. The lowest was contractor to government.   
Government trustors reported significantly higher levels of project communication (F-
statistic = 13.87, P< .001), coordination communication (F-statistic = 7.40, P< .01), and 
perceived follow-through (F-statistic = 6.46, p< .05) than contractors.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
















Dev. F-statistic Mean Mean  Mean Mean 
1. Trust 4.97 1.36 5.21 1.34 4.92 1.35 2.19 5.2 5.3 5.0 4.6 
2. Trust propensity 3.81 0.80 3.71 0.52 3.84  .84 1.51 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.9 
3. Formalization 4.26 1.07 4.70 0.87 4.15 1.07 15.39*** 4.6 4.8 4.0 4.7 
4. Risk 3.96 1.17 3.79 1.08 3.99 1.17 1.51 3.9 3.6 3.9 4.3 
5. Reward 5.77 1.04 5.38 0.93 5.86 1.04 11.72*** 5.3 5.5 5.8 5.9 
6. Project comms. 4.39 5.62 6.85 8.37 3.76 4.44 13.87*** 7.8 5.2 4.1 2.1 
7. Coordination comms. 3.11 4.10 4.46 4.92 2.68 3.72 7.40** 5.2 3.2 2.8 2.0 
8. Personal comms. 2.27 2.58 2.81 2.79 2.11 2.52 2.69 3.4 1.6 2.2 1.6 
9. Hours F2F 4.50 6.74 5.38 5.79 4.32 6.97 1.37 5.5 5.2 4.8 2.6 
10. Perceived trustworthiness 5.60 1.17 5.77 1.05 5.57 1.19 1.56 5.7 5.9 5.6 5.3 
11. Perceived follow-through 5.43 1.29 5.81 1.18 5.35 1.30 6.46* 5.9 5.7 5.4 5.2 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10 
Correlations between variables are reported in Table 2.  Trust was significantly related to 
formalization (r = .14, p< .05) and personal communications (r= .17, p< .05), but there was no 
significant relationship to risk (r=-.08, n.s.) or reward (r= -.04, n.s.). 
Table 2. Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Trust          
2. Formalization  .14*         
3. Risk -.08 -.23***        
4. Reward -.04  .12*  .18***       
5. Project comms.  .18** -.05  .05 -.09      
6. Coordination comms.  .14*  .02 -.05  .01  .75***     
7. Personal comms.  .17* .00  .01 -.18  .64***  .56***    
8. Hours F2F  .24*** .00  .03 -.16**  .42***  .31***  .44***   
9. Perceived trustworthiness  .80***  .13* -.06 -.04  .12+  .07  .17*  .24***  
10. Perceived follow-through  .60***  .05  .05 -.06  .17**  .08  .22**  .30***  .68***
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that when the trustor and trustee belong to the same 
organization there will be a positive relationship between trust and formalization.  Both 
government and contractor trustors had high levels of trust, between which there was no 
significant difference (F-statistic = 2.19, n.s.) (See Table 1).  When we distinguish dyads by both 
trustor and trustee (e.g., government trustor and government trustee—G to G), the dyads with 
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the highest trust were government to contractor (M = 5.3) and government to government (M = 
5.2). The lowest was contractor to government (4.6).  Government trustors reported significantly 
higher levels of formalization (F-statistic = 15.39, p< .001) than contractor trustors.   
To test the hypothesis, we conducted regression models for each of the different dyad 
types (see Table 3).  In model 2, there was a significant positive relationship between 
formalization and trust among government trustors and government trustees (β = .31, p< .05). 
Yet, no significant relationship existed for contractor-to-contractor dyads (β = -.06, n.s.).  This 
data provides partial support for hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that in dyads when trustor and trustee belong to the different 
organizations there will be a negative relationship between trust and formalization.  In model 2, 
there was a negative relationship between formalization and trust in government-to-contractor 
dyads (β = -1.02, p< .01) and a barely significant negative relationship for contractor–to-
government dyads (β = -.36, p< .10). This data supports hypothesis 2. 
Table 3. Comparison of OLS Estimates (Standardized beta Values) of Trust 
 Gov to Gov Gov to ConCon to Con  Con to Gov
 M1 M2  M1  M2 M1 M2   M1  M2. 
Intercept +  ***  ***    
Formalization  .44*  .31* -1.02**-.69  .05 -.06  -.13  -.36+
Risk -.61* -.08   .45+  .46 -.02 -.29***  -.36  -.57* 
Reward  .14 -.06   .17  .14  .02  .32***  .52+ .07 
Project communication -.14 -.01   .14 -.06  .11 -.00  .11  .83+
Coordination communication-.56 -.15   .19  .23  .00  .06  .05  -.36 
Personal communication  .87** .38*   .20  .20  .07 -.04  .41  -.47 
Perceived trustworthiness   .71***   .35   .56***   .72**
Perceived follow-through   .04   .70   .35***   .40+
Adj. R-squared  .37  .71 0.71 0.71-.02  .63  -.09  0.73 
Model F 3.60*13.11***5.82* 4.440.65 22.78*** 0.77  6.73**
Degrees of freedom 6, 21 8, 19 6, 6 8, 3 6, 1098, 93  6, 11 8, 9 
 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .10  (C = Contractor, G = Government) 
DISCUSSION 
Our results support our theories, which propose there is a positive relationship between 
trust and formalization in dyads within organizations, but a negative relationship between trust 
and formalization in dyads that span organizational boundaries. 
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Likewise, market control mechanisms operating at the firm level may be ineffective in 
regulating behavior at the interpersonal level. 
In our qualitative results, both the government and contractors asked for more controls, 
although the level of formalization in both organizations was moderate, with government 
personnel rating formalization slightly higher than the contractors (Government 4.7 and 
Contractor 4.15 out of 7).   
In our quantitative results, formalization increased trust for government trustors, but was 
not significant for contractors.  In contrast, contractors’ trust was associated with lower risks and 
higher rewards.  These differences between government and contractor organizations could 
indicate differences in organizational context or organizational culture.  More research is needed 
to determine the source of this difference. 
The relationships between trust and formalization that applied within the government and 
contractor organizations did not apply across organizational boundaries.  Although formalization 
increased trust of Government trustors for government trustees, formalization was negatively 
related to trust when the trustee was a contractor.  Similarly, although trust was not significant 
for contractors within their organization, contractor trustors also had a negative relationship 
between formalization and trust when the trustee was a government representative.  This 
confirms that there is a negative relationship between formalization and trust when the dyad 
spans organizational boundaries. 
Given the market relationship between the government and contracting organizations, it 
is possible that their formal rules only applied within each organization, and that there were few, 
if any, rules that applied across organizations. For example, the government’s rules applied to 
government personnel; yet, those same rules might not apply to the contractor’s personnel.  
Similarly, the contractor’s rules may not apply to government personnel.   
When the organizational control is a market relationship at the organizational level; 
highly interdependent work seems to be difficult at the interpersonal level.  In this context, we 
found individuals experienced difficulties which they felt could be alleviated by greater 
hierarchical control. 
Although trust can be an alternative to hierarchical control, that trust must be built 
through shared norms and values; these may not exist between different organizations such as 
government and contractors. 
Implications for Managers 
This research does not question the basis for the government’s decision to rely upon 
industry for its research and development; there are obviously good and enduring reasons for 
that policy.  Given that the government and an increasing number of other organizations 
manage R&D through the market form of organizational control, what more can be done to 
facilitate the development of quality products developed within time and budget constraints? 
1. Foremost in such contractual relationships is the realization on the part of 
organizational leaders that a substantial structural difference exists, especially in 
the case of government-industry (buyer/seller) partnerships.  These structural 
differences create different risks and rewards for team members representing 
buyer-organizations compared to seller organizations.   
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2. Equally important is the need to develop trust without relying upon formalization, 
because formal rules could reduce trust.  Alternative trust-building methods 
should be used, such as emphasizing shared goals and values by top 
management and enculturation of new team members. 
3. Managers of outsourced new product development should be aware of the 
symbolic impact of their actions and consider how those actions will be 
interpreted by both buyer and seller representatives.   
4. The client and contractor organizations should consider how inter-organizational 
rules could be instituted in ways that would facilitate, rather than erode, trust.  For 
example, Positive Organizational Change initiatives (such as Appreciative 
Inquiry) could identify changes in ways that avoid the downward spiral of 
formalization.  Likewise, an innovative approach toward trans-organizational 
individual (not just enterprise) rewards might be considered for improved 
motivation. 
5. Program Managers should consider what teambuilding activities can be used to 
facilitate the development of trust and collective identity.  Although the 
government has rules against the provision of benefits such as food and 
entertainment, opportunities may be created for government and contractor 
personnel to interact in social contexts. 
6. Program Managers should bring the risks associated with lack of trust into 
explicit and conscious awareness.  They can ensure the government personnel 
understand the problems they can cause by suggesting changes which would be 
overruled at a later date.  They can also ensure the contractor engineers 
understand the loss they can create by ignoring valid suggestions from 
government personnel.   
7. Program Managers should ensure team members understand their roles.  Of 
particular importance is that the government representative understands the 
facilitation role—as opposed to a line-management role.  Likewise, members of 
interfacing teams should be trained to understand project interdependencies and 
how to achieve component integration.   
8. Finally, management should measure achievement in areas highly influenced by 
trust, such as government-to-contractor knowledge transfer and system 
integration. 
This study was limited by the small number of respondents.  Division of the dyads by 
both trustor and trustee yielded very small samples, but some statistically significant results 
were obtained.  Our study is also a snapshot of the situation at a point in time, while trust is 
dynamic and varies over time.  Therefore, we could learn more with a longitudinal study. 
CONCLUSION 
Trust is proposed as a way to extend market control of R&D and new product 
development.   
We found that team members representing buyers had different relationships between 
control mechanisms, such as formalization and trust, than those representing sellers.  Within 
their organizations, buyer’s representatives had a positive relationship between formalization 
and trust, but that relationship did not exist for the seller’s representatives. When 
representatives operated across organizational boundaries, the relationship between 
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formalization and trust was negative, indicating that greater formalization could lead to less 
trust.  
We encourage managers of outsourced new-product development to be aware of 
differences in trust and control between buyer and seller representatives in such teams. 
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